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I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of Americans own insurance policies. They pay pre-
miums for insurance coverage that is difficult if not impossible to
understand. In fact, most Americans find their policies so confusing
that they do not even read them.l As a result, insurance companies
can present a policyholder with standard policies without ever giving
the policyholder the opportunity to negotiate the terms. Negotiating
policies individually would likely put insurance companies out of
business because of the enormous cost or render insurance coverage
so costly that only the rich could afford it. Presently, policyholders
have to accept the standard forms because the only alternative is to
forego insurance, which could be disastrous.
Courts interpret insurance policies with this inequality in mind,2
1. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970).
2. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw § 25C, at 104 (1987).
1113
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recognizing that policyholders rarely have an opportunity to negoti-
ate their policies and often are forced to accept provisions or exclu-
sions which they do not want.3 Since insurance policies are
standardized forms, usually the only differences from policy to policy
are marketing, service, and premiums. By using traditional contract
interpretation tools, the courts attempt to effectuate the intent of the
parties while giving the policyholder an extra measure of protec-
tion.4 Often these tools create rights for the policyholder that ex-
tend beyond those discernable from the actual language of the
policy.5
Although courts frequently use traditional tools to interpret insur-
ance contracts, these tools sometimes are inadequate to determine
the parties' intent or resolve the inequality created by the policy-
holder's lack of bargaining power. 6 Insurance policies may require
additional safeguards in situations where the traditional tools do not
apply. 7 By recognizing that the policyholder may have expectations
of coverage different from the explicit language of the policy, courts
further protect policyholders from their lack of bargaining power.
This additional safeguard is the reasonable expectations doctrine.8
The doctrine of reasonable expectations allows the court to impose
liability on the insurer for misleading the policyholder or to mandate
coverage when it seems fair to do so.9
Jerry correctly observes that no real contract negotiation occurs in the sale and mar-
keting of insurance policies. Instead, policyholders are confronted with a take-it-or-
leave-it choice. In most transactions, the policyholder does not even receive the pol-
icy until after the policyholder pays the first premium. Id. § 25C, at 104-05.
3. Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323,
326 (1986) (quoting Dover-Glass Works Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 29 A. 1039,
1041 (Del. 1894)). Rahdert recognizes that this inequality comes from the absence of
bargaining power, common use of standard preprinted forms, and mass marketing by
powerful, sophisticated underwriters. The individual policyholder, by contrast, has
few assets or resources with which to bargain. Id.
4. For further discussion of the traditional tools of contract interpretation, see
infra parts II.A-B. These traditional tools have been brought over to insurance law
from ordinary contract law. As with waiver and estoppel, many of these tools have
developed over time into entirely different theories from what they once were.
5. Keeton, supra note 1, at 962.
6. Rahdert, supra note 3, at 341. Insurers find it relatively easy to insert defini-
tions, conditions, and exclusions to reduce their risk and regularly do so. Insurers
face, and may yield to, the temptation to shift more and more risk to the policy-
holder. Id.
7. Keeton, supra note 1, at 973.
8. JERRY, supra note 2, § 25D, at 109.
9. Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1155 (1981). Abraham
groups cases involving the reasonable expectations doctrine into two categories: the
"misleading impression" theme and the "mandated coverage" theme. The "mis-
leading impression" theme includes automated marketing cases, accident insurance
coverage bearing a misleading name, and temporary life insurance. Id. at 1155-62.
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Unfortunately, application of the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions has been inconsistent.0 Courts often confuse it with other
tools of contract interpretation or simply misapply it. I I In Minne-
sota, the supreme court has embraced the reasonable expectations
doctrine but has not provided adequate guidelines for its applica-
tion.12 As a result, litigants and the lower courts are frequently con-
fused about how to apply the doctrine.'t
This Note clarifies the doctrine of reasonable expectations and
provides guidelines for its future application. Part II examines both
the traditional tools of contract interpretation and the development
of the reasonable expectations doctrine. Part III discusses the appli-
cation of the doctrine in Minnesota, and part IV provides guidelines
for future application of the doctrine, including sample jury
instructions.
II. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY
A contract for insurance is an agreement in which the insurer as-
sumes the policyholder's risk in exchange for consideration.14 Like
The mandated coverage theme includes the duty to defend and the extension of du-
ration of coverage. Id. at 1162-68.
10. See infra notes 64-65 for discussion of judicial treatment of the doctrine in
other states.
11. See infra notes 94-97 for Minnesota cases that confuse the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine with the doctrine of ambiguity. This confusion appears to make some
courts reluctant to use the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Unless remedied,
courts may eventually stop using the doctrine altogether. In light of the special na-
ture of insurance policies, the doctrine is too important to be ignored.
12. The court attempted to provide guidelines for the doctrine's application in
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn.
1985). As discussed below, the resulting confusion indicates a need for more
guidance.
13. See infra part III for a discussion of Minnesota's application of the doctrine.
14. JERRY, supra note 2, § 1l[2][d], at 15. When people are averse to the risk of
loss, they are willing to pay someone else to assume that risk. Insurance companies
can afford to assume the risk by pooling many risks together. This pooling results in
a distribution of the individual's risk throughout the pool. Id. § 10C, at 12.
This pooling of risks can be traced back to the primitive forms of insurance in
ancient societies. Social or religious groups gave assistance to the needy from a com-
mon fund. Commercial insurance has been found in the Code of Hammurabi, the
Hindu Laws of Manu and the laws of the ancient Greeks. JERRY, supra note 2, § 11, at
16-18.
By the twelfth century, insurance contracts were already significantly used in me-
dieval maritime Italy. By 1688, Lloyd's Coffee House in London used insurance con-
tracts to protect merchants' cargo. Anyone interested in insuring cargo could write a
bid on a slip of paper which was passed around. The merchant usually accepted the
lowest bid. Policyholders in the United States were paying 253 billion dollars annu-
ally in premiums by 1984. In 1985, the United States insurance industry had assets
exceeding 1.3 trillion dollars. Id.; see also WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF INSURANCE, at 7-35 (Buist M. Anderson ed., 3d ed. 1951).
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any contract, insurance policies are subject to interpretation by the
courts.' 5 Initially insurance policies were interpreted in the same
manner as any other contract.' 6 By determining the meaning of a
contract, a court attempts to effectuate the intent of the contracting
parties.17 However, by the early twentieth century, courts recog-
nized that insurance contracts were unique because of their esoteric
nature and the lack of opportunity for the policyholders to partici-
pate in the negotiation of their own policy.' 8 Insurers frequently
sought to construe words in the policy as terms of art despite the fact
that few policyholders could be expected to understand their
meaning. 19
Courts frequently use traditional tools of contract interpretation to
determine the parties' intent in an insurance policy. The doctrines
of ambiguity, adhesion, reformation, waiver, estoppel, and uncon-
scionability are the interpretive tools most often applied to insurance
contracts. 20 However, these doctrines have limitations and cannot
be applied in every case.
15. The courts use various principles to resolve interpretation disputes. These
principles include: 1) giving great weight to the purpose of the parties; 2) interpret-
ing a writing as a whole and interpreting separate writings from the same transaction
together; 3) giving language its generally understood meaning; 4) interpreting tech-
nical terms according to their technical meaning if used in a transaction in that tech-
nical field; 5) giving great weight to course of performance; 6) interpreting terms of
an agreement consistently with each other; 7) when possible, interpreting terms in a
way that gives them relevance in their setting; 8) favoring interpretations that make a
contract legal over those that make it illegal; 9) attributing greater weight to specific
terms than to standardized terms; 10) attributing greater weight to express terms
than implied terms; 11) attributing greater weight to express terms than to terms
implied by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade; 12) if alter-
native meanings exist, preferring the one favoring the non-drafting party; and
13) when choosing among alternative means, preferring the one favoring public in-
terest over one that does not. JERRY, supra note 2, § 25A, at 101-02.
16. Early courts simply looked to the contract language to determine the intent
of the parties. See, e.g., Dover-Glass Works Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 29 A. 1039,
1041 (Del. 1894); Drilling v. New York Life Ins. Co., 137 N.E. 314, 316 (N.Y. 1922).
17. Id. § 25, at 94. Jerry defines interpretation as a "process by which a court
determines the meaning that it will give the language used by the parties in a con-
tract." Id.
18. See, e.g., Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d
388, 393 n.6 (Ariz. 1984) (noting that it is time to remove insurance from the land of
make-believe); Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 107 P. 292, 293-
94 (Cal. 1910) (recognizing that the numerous conditions and exclusions were traps
for the unwary insured who did not understand the language of an insurance contract
which he had no role in negotiating).
19. The mass-marketing of insurance policies to policyholders who are depen-
dent on insurance allows insurance companies to manipulate the fine print. Rahdert,
supra note 3, at 326.
20. See infra part II.A-C for a discussion of these tools and doctrines.
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The reasonable expectations2t doctrine evolved out of the notion
that policyholders may have rights not necessarily found within the
four corners of the policy. These rights may even be at variance with
the policy language.22 Unlike the other tools, the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine is used only in the interpretation of insurance poli-
cies. A careful examination of the limitations of traditional tools and
doctrines that apply to insurance contracts helps explain the emer-
gence of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
A. Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation
1. Doctrine of Ambiguity
The first place a court looks in interpreting a contract is the writ-
ing itself. If the writing appears clear on its face, its meaning will be
determined from the four comers of the document.23 If a term is not
clear, the court applies the doctrine of ambiguity.24 Recognizing
that the drafter has the best opportunity to prevent ambiguity, the
doctrine resolves ambiguous terms against the party that drafted the
contract.25 The doctrine represents the court's effort to prevent
sharp drafting and to factor in the drafter's ability to correct any
problems.26
The doctrine of ambiguity is widely used by courts to "ameliorate
harsh effects that would otherwise result from insurance policy
terms." 27 This doctrine provides the court with a means for inter-
preting unclear policy language, to protect the policyholder, 28 while
remaining within the bounds of a legal theory of contract
interpretation.29
21. "Expectations" refers to the rights a policyholder believes he or she has
against the insurer at the time the parties form their agreement. Abraham, supra note
9, at 1169 n.73.
22. Keeton, supra note 1, at 961.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 200-204 (1981); see also Morris v.
Weiss, 414 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
24. The doctrine of ambiguity is often referred to by its Latin name, contra profer-
entum. See BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990).
25. 2 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA (SECOND) OF INSURANCE LAw § 15:74 (rev. 2d ed.
1984); see also Goucher v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 324 A.2d 657, 662 (R.I.
1974) (construing ambiguities in policy against the insurer).
26. Rahdert, supra note 3, at 328-29.
27. ROBERT F. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw 629 (1978).
28. The California Supreme Court, for example, has used the doctrine of ambi-
guity as follows:
[I]f the insurer uses language which is uncertain any reasonable doubt
will be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to extent or fact of coverage,
whether as to peril insured against ... the amount of liability, or the person
or persons protected, the language will be understood in its most inclusive
sense, for the benefit of the insured.
Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 296 P.2d 801, 809-10 (Cal. 1956).
29. One commentator argues that application of the doctrine of ambiguity pro-
19921
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When a case arises where the other traditional rules of contract
interpretation do not apply, courts often stretch to find an ambiguity
where none existed in order to achieve a fair result.30 However, in-
venting ambiguities to arrive at a "proper" result undermines confi-
dence in the judicial system by creating unpredictability and giving
an impression of judicial prejudice in favor of the policyholder. 3'
The reasonable expectations doctrine is a way to avoid manufactur-
ing ambiguities in order to apply the doctrine of ambiguity. Unfortu-
nately, the courts often confuse the doctrine of ambiguity with the
reasonable expectations doctrine.3 2
Minnesota courts recognize the doctrine of ambiguity and often
fall into the trap of confusing it with the reasonable expectations
doctrine.33 Minnesota courts address the two doctrines together by
applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations only in the pres-
ence of an existing ambiguity.34 This application is incorrect. The
doctrine of ambiguity is a separate doctrine. As a tool of first resort,
the doctrine of ambiguity should be applied before even considering
the reasonable expectations doctrine. The doctrine of reasonable
expectations is a tool of last resort for interpreting insurance con-
tracts: the policyholder's expectations should be considered only
when no ambiguity exists.35
vides the court with consistent results in cases involving insurance disputes, which in
time could induce the industry to respond by clarifying the policy language. Rahdert,
supra note 3, at 329. If so, one would expect to see the doctrine of ambiguity used
less frequently after those policies are clarified.
30. See Morgan v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 400 P.2d 223, 224-25 (Cal. 1965)
(noting cases that have been decided on the basis of ambiguity where none, in fact,
existed).
31. KEETON & WIDIss, supra note 27, at 632-34. Keeton and Widiss note that if
the result in such cases is supportable at all, it must be due to application of the
principles of the reasonable expectations doctrine, whether or not expressly stated by
the court. Id.
32. For example, some courts require ambiguity before the doctrine of reason-
able expectations can be invoked. See, e.g., Carley v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.,
521 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (declining to consider policyholders'
expectations in the absence of an ambiguity in the policy provisions).
33. Minnesota case law generally finds two types of ambiguity in insurance con-
tracts. Either the ambiguity results from policy terms that are susceptible to more
than one meaning, or it results from irreconcilable conflicts between terms or provi-
sions in the policy. Morris v. Weiss, 414 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see
also Nordby v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn. 1983).
34. See Bob Useldinger & Sons v. Hangsleben, 483 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); Morris v. Weiss, 414 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Curtis v. Home
Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
35. It is possible for the court to use both tools in interpreting different portions
of the same policy. An excellent example is found in Wessman v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1991). In Wessman, the court granted summary
judgment to the insurance company. The Wessmans appealed, and the Eighth Cir-
cuit remanded the case for factfinding on the reasonable expectations of the policy-
1118 [Vol. 18
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2. Adhesion
Insurance contracts are almost always contracts of adhesion be-
cause they are drafted by the insurer.36 As Professor Williston ob-
served, to deny this fact is to deny the realities of the drafting and
marketing of insurance policies:
[Insurance contracts are drafted] with the aid of skillful and
highly paid legal talent, from which no deviation desired by an ap-
plicant will be permitted. The established underwriter is magnifi-
cently qualified to understand and protect its own selfish interests.
In contrast, the applicant is a shorn lamb driven to accept whatever
contract may be offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis if he wishes
insurance protection. 37
In the context of insurance policy coverage disputes, the doctrine
of adhesion is a mechanism used to implement the important social
policy of leveling the playing field for the policyholder. Recognizing
the fact that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion allows
courts to apply pro-policyholder interpretive techniques.38 Using
these techniques on insurance policies often creates rights for the
policyholder that are at variance with the policy. 39 The use of the
adhesion doctrine to protect the policyholder is an essential justifica-
tion for applying the pro-policyholder interpretive tools such as the
doctrine of reasonable expectations. The doctrine of adhesion sup-
ports the use of the reasonable expectations doctrine because it is
the adhesive nature of insurance contracts that allows the courts to
consider and give effect to the reasonable expectations of the
policyholder.
3. Reformation
Reformation is an equitable remedy available when the written
agreement is inconsistent with the actual agreement of the parties.40
holder. Id. at 407. In addition, the court found independent grounds for reversal
based on the ambiguous terms in the policy. Id.
36. See Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Dis-
closure in Contract Formation, 39 U. PITr. L. REV. 381, 387-400 (1978). Holmes points
out that insurance contracts are adhesive because of "the inequality in bargaining
power and knowledge as between insurer and applicant, the technical character of
the insurance contract, the fact that delivery of the policy often occurs after contract
formation and premium payment, and the mass-standardized nature of insurance
contracts." Id. at 397 (footnotes omitted).
37. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 19-20
(W. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1973).
38. See, e.g., Cairns v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 398 N.W.2d 821, 824-25 (Iowa
1987) (employing pro-policyholder presumption of adhesion contract to interpret
policy to provide coverage based on techniques commonly used in statutory
interpretation).
39. JERRY, supra note 2, § 25C, at 106.
40. Id. § 25H.
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The classic application of the reformation remedy is a situation
where fraud or mistake by one or both parties results in an inconsis-
tency between the intended agreement and the actual written con-
tract.4 The inconsistent writing will be cured by reforming the
contract to reflect the parties' intent or the intent of the innocent
party. 42 However, reformation is limited to situations of mutual mis-
take or when the parties at least share knowledge of a mistake. To
avoid rewriting the contract for the parties, the court uses reforma-
tion with great caution.43
B. Other Doctrines Affecting Coverage Disputes
1. Waiver and Estoppel
Although waiver and estoppel are separate theories, they are often
treated as one doctrine in insurance contracts. It is unclear whether
this merging of the doctrines by courts is intentional.44
Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right.45 Courts
use it when an insurer acts as if the insurance policy is valid but
knows that a ground exists upon which the policy should be
voided.46 Estoppel is the imposition of liability for a misleading
statement or action upon which the other party has detrimentally re-
lied.47 Generally, the act of one party creates waiver, while opera-
tion of law creates estoppel.48 Collectively, both doctrines create
rights for the policyholder that are at variance with the policy itself.49
They constitute additional methods to effectuate the true intent of
the parties.
Waiver and estoppel are limited in many ways. They cannot be
used to affect rights that exist for a public purpose. Both may be
limited by the parol evidence rule.50 In addition, some courts will
not allow waiver or estoppel to expand coverage, 5' holding instead
41. Id.
42. KEETON & WiDISS, supra note 27, at 616.
43. JERRY, supra note 2, § 25H.
44. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 27, at 617.
45. JERRY, supra note 2, § 25E[a].
46. Id. § 25E[b]. The most common example of waiver occurs when the com-
pany accepts a premium for coverage, knowing that the insured has already breached
a warranty. A less common example occurs when the insurer pays a claim with full
knowledge of the facts. Hartford v. Doubler, 434 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ill. 1982). For
example, the court in Hartford held that this payment constituted a waiver of the
policy exclusion. Id. Some courts, however, refuse to apply the doctrine of waiver
where it will expand coverage.
47. JERRY, supra note 2, § 25E[a].
48. Id.
49. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 27, at 618.
50. JERRY, supra note 2, § 25E, at 114.
51. Id. § 44, at 194. In Minnesota, for example, waiver and estoppel cannot be
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that they can be used only to prevent rescission or to defend a claim
within the policy.52 Waiver and estoppel are further limited by the
relative rarity of factual situations to which they can apply.
Waiver and estoppel focus on rights and conduct that the policy-
holder may have voluntarily given away, not on the policyholder's
expectations of coverage. As a result, they do not reach the heart of
the cases that are best decided by the reasonable expectations doc-
trine. Rarely does the policyholder ever form an intention to waive
or not to waive. The doctrine of waiver is particularly ill-suited be-
cause no one thinks about it until there is a loss. Waiver may become
an issue, but only after it has been decided that the policyholder's
expectations were reasonable. In some cases the policyholder may
have waived that element of coverage.
2. Unconscionability
All insurance contracts run the risk of having unconscionable
terms because they are drafted solely from the insurer's perspective,
and the language chosen is not subject to negotiation.53 The lack of
negotiation, coupled with the vast experience of the insurer with
prior claims, results in language which strongly favors the insurer.54
Insurance contracts provide insurers with many opportunities for
overreaching when drafting their policies,55 and courts at times
refuse to enforce these terms even if they are clear and
unambiguous .56
used to expand coverage, but can only affect rights reserved in the policy. See, e.g.,
Shannon v. Great American Ins. Co., 276 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. 1979); Minnesota
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 372 N.W.2d 763, 767
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Minnesota Mut. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Rudzinske, 347
N.W.2d 848, 851 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
52. JERRY, supra note 2, § 25E[c].
53. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 963.
54. Rahdert, supra note 3, at 339 n.50 (citing U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) and RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 268 (1981)); see generally John E. Murray, Un-
conscionability: Unconscionability 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1969).
55. Keeton, supra note 1, at 963.
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Werland Life Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433, 443-44 (Cal. 1975)
(adopting rule that insurance can only be terminated by insurer giving both notice of
rejection and a refund of the premium because it is unconscionable for an insurance
company to hold premium without providing coverage); C & J Fertilizer v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 179-81 (Iowa 1975) (holding that unconscionability
is alternative basis for achieving the same result mandated by reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 263 N.W.2d 311, 315
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (awarding coverage in the absence of ambiguity because policy
provision was unconscionable); Glarner v. Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 591, 595-96
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that conditional receipts creating illusory coverage
are unconscionable); Storms v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 580
(N.H. 1987) (holding that insured's reasonable expectations will not be delimited by
policy language even if such language is clear so long as reliance is reasonable); Mills
1992]
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C. Emergence of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
While the traditional doctrines of interpretation have been impor-
tant in determining rights at variance with the policy, a void never-
theless remains which the reasonable expectations doctrine fills.
Cases abound in which no ambiguity was present, no rights were
waived, and no basis for estoppel can be found. Unequal bargaining
power is present, but the stringent requirements of the doctrine of
adhesion may not be present.
In the past, courts had to "bend and stretch" these doctrines in
order to decide in favor of the policyholder.57 Today, the reasonable
expectations doctrine solves many of the problems posed by the ine-
quality of the parties. The doctrine of reasonable expectations al-
lows courts, as a last resort, to bring fairness to the insurance
contract by giving legal effect to the policyholder's expectations.
The courts began looking at the reasonable expectations of policy-
holders in order to find rights that could not be found in the policy.
One of the first cases to employ this principle was Kievit v. Loyal Pro-
tective Life Insurance Co.58 In Kievet, the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted, "When members of the public purchase policies of insurance
they are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary to ful-
fill their reasonable expectations."59
The principles that were developed in these early cases were for-
v. Agrichemical Aviation, 250 N.W.2d 663, 668-69 (N.D. 1977) (invoking doctrine of
reasonable expectations to allow coverage despite clear and unambiguous policy lan-
guage); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honor-
ing the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1152 n.2 (1981);
Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485 (1967).
57. The language "bend and stretch" is taken from the Minnesota Supreme
Court's description of what courts do to find justice in these cases. See Atwater
Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985).
58. 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961). In Kievit, the policyholder suffered from body trem-
ors after being hit on the head with a piece of wood. The tremors were the result of a
preexisting, but latent, Parkinson's disease which the blow triggered. The policy cov-
ered loss "resulting directly and independently of all other causes from accidental
bodily injur[y]," excluding disability resulting from or contributed to by any disease
or ailment. Id. at 24. The policyholder recovered based on his reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage. Id. at 23-26.
59. Id. at 26. Other early cases include Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168,
171 (Cal. 1966) (holding that provision regarding duty to defend should be con-
strued to honor the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage); Steven v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284, 288 (Cal. 1962) (holding that insured may reasonably
expect coverage for whole trip when he buys flight insurance from a vending machine
at the airport); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 425 P.2d 346, 348 (Nev. 1967) (holding
that conditional receipt creates temporary life insurance, fulfilling the insured's rea-
sonable expectations of coverage); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 225 A.2d 328,
334 (N.J. 1966) (stressing that reasonable expectations are to be determined and
fulfilled solely from the perspective of a local policy in a local relationship); Allen v.
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mally articulated as an insurance law doctrine by Professor Keeton in
1970. "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and in-
tended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will
be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions
would have negated those expectations."60 The policy thus defined
does not inherently depend on the language of the policy. Keeton
concluded that although the doctrine was too broad to be universally
true, it was a principle that should be adopted into insurance law. 6'
Application of the reasonable expectations doctrine revolves
around several factors: the likelihood that the policyholder expected
coverage, the insurer's responsibility for creating the expectation,
and the substantive unfairness of the policy provision. 62 Courts in-
voke the doctrine where the insurer has misled the policyholder,
where coverage is desirable, and perhaps most importantly, where
the court perceives itself as possessing the power and duty to provide
coverage. 63
Although the reasonable expectations doctrine has been adopted
by the majority of states, it is not uniformly applied. Two variations
of the doctrine are prevalent. The original formulation by Keeton
applies the reasonable expectations doctrine extensively to broaden
coverage at all levels of policy interpretation. A more restricted view
of the doctrine limits its application, for example, to cases in which
ambiguous policy language is at issue.64 Finally, some states have
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 638, 644-45 (N.J. 1965) (recognizing that in the
interests of justice the expectations should not be frustrated).
60. Keeton, supra note 1, at 967.
61. Id.
62. Abraham, supra note 9, at 1154. Abraham notes four situations where the
doctrine applies: 1) when the policy itself creates an expectation; 2) when the in-
surer is directly responsible for the policyholder's expectations; 3) when the insured
is indirectly responsible for the policyholder's expectations; and 4) when the expec-
tations are created by forces for which the insurer is not responsible. Id. at 1181-85.
63. Id. at 1154-63.
64. States that have considered and adopted the reasonable expectations doc-
trine have generally done so in one of the following two ways:
Many states have based the doctrine on Keeton's formula: Alaska Rural Elec.
Coop. v. INSCO Ltd., 785 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Alaska 1990); Gordinier v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283 (Ariz. 1987); AeroJet General Corp. v. Superior
Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 224-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Sanchez v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 974, 977 (Colo. App. 1984); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co.
v. Brooks, 686 P.2d 23, 27 (Haw. 1984); Penalosa Coop Exch. v. Farmland Mut. Ins.
Co., 789 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724
S.W.2d 210, 212-13 (Ky. 1986); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Braun,
793 P.2d 253, 255-56 (Mont. 1990); Town of Epping v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 444 A.2d 496, 498 (N.H. 1982); Great American Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr.,
279 S.E.2d 769, 771 (N.C. 1981); Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 345 S.E.2d 33, 35
(W. Va. 1986).
Other states have indicated a mixed acceptance either by limiting the doctrine or
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simply rejected the doctrine.65
III. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE IN MINNESOTA
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has clearly adopted the
Keeton formula, subsequent decisions have not applied the formula
consistently. The complexity of the doctrine requires the supreme
court to form standards to guide litigants and the lower courts. The
doctrine must be clarified to achieve more effective consumer protec-
tion for the policyholder and more predictable results for the in-
surer. Analysis of the Minnesota cases utilizing the doctrine provides
a clear view of how the courts have strayed from a useful application
of the doctrine.
A. The Atwater Case
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co. 6 6 is con-
sidered the seminal reasonable expectations case in Minnesota. 67
Atwater involved a burglary of chemicals worth $15,587.40 from
Atwater's warehouse.68 Atwater's policy excluded coverage for bur-
by accepting it at one level and not at another. Carley v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty
Co., 521 A.2d 1053, 1057-58 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
299 S.E.2d 561, 563 (Ga. 1983); Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. General Casualty Cos.,
525 N.E.2d 965, 967 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Lepic v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 402 N.W.2d
758, 762 (Iowa 1987); Falgout v. Wilson, 531 So. 2d 492, 493 (La. Ct. App. 1988);
Baybutt Contr. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914, 921-22 (Me.
1983); Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Continental Casualty Co., 506
N.E.2d 118, 120 (Mass. 1987); Werner Indus. Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 548 A.2d
188, 192 (NJ. 1988); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 433 A.2d
906, 908 (Penn. 1981); Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 814 n.1
(R.I. 1977); Mary Kay Cosmetics Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 739 S.W.2d 608, 613
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987); see also Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d
104 (Iowa 1981). In Sandbulte, for example, the court held that the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations would only apply if the exclusion either 1) is bizarre or oppres-
sive, 2) eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or 3) eliminates the dominant purpose
of the transaction. 302 N.W.2d at 112.
65. In the following decisions, the courts have explicitly rejected the doctrine:
Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979) (refusing to adopt
the reasonable expectations doctrine because the plain wording of the insurance pol-
icy should control); Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192,
1197 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to adopt reasonable expectations doctrine be-
cause it requires courts to rewrite insurance contracts); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mangum,
383 S.E.2d 464, 467 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the reasonable expectations
doctrine would not be applied to insurance policies where the intention of the parties
is clear); Keenan v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co. of N.W., 738 P.2d 270, 275 (Wash.
1987) (holding that the reasonable expectations doctrine did not apply to insurance
contracts that contained no ambiguity).
66. 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985).
67. See Gerald J. Morris, Comment, Great Expectations for the Reasonable Expectation
Doctrine, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 371, 371 (1986) (analyzing Atwater).
68. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 274.
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glaries unless the building showed visible signs of forced entry.69
Western National, Atwater's insurer, denied the claim because the
exterior of the building showed no visible marks of physical damage
at the point of entrance. The court stated that the policy's definition
of "burglary" was clear, precise, and unambiguous. 70 Nevertheless,
the parties in the case did not dispute that a burglary had occurred. 7'
In order to honor Atwater's expectation that its policy would cover a
burglary, the court adopted the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions.72 In doing so, the court defined the doctrine 73 and gave its
reasons for adopting it: "The reasonable-expectations doctrine
gives the court a standard by which to construe insurance contracts
without having to rely on arbitrary rules which do not reflect real-life
situations and without having to bend and stretch those rules to do jus-
tice in individual cases." 74
The Atwater court gave examples where the doctrine would apply,
such as when the policyholder was not told of important, but ob-
scure, conditions or exclusions in the insurance policy or when a
provision is common enough that the general public expects their
risks to be covered.75 In a statement responsible for much of the
69. The provisions of the policy included the following definition of burglary:
The felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within the premises
by a person making felonious entry therein by actual force and violence, of
which force and violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives,
electricity or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the
premises at the place of such entry, or ... (3) from within the premises by a
person making a felonious exit therefrom by actual force and violence as
evidenced by visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemi-
cals upon, or physical damage to, the interior of the premises at the place of
such exit.
Id. at 275.
70. The Atwater court rejected the analysis by other courts that have concluded
that this definition of burglary is ambiguous. Id. at 276, (citing United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Woodward, 164 S.E.2d 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)).
71. The trial court found no fraud and determined that it was not an inside job.
Id.
72. Id. at 278. Atwater's expectation of coverage came from its 30-year relation-
ship with Western. Evidence also existed that Western's agent did not tell Atwater
about the exclusion. Id. The court also pointed out that a business which purchases
insurance for burglaries is seeking coverage whether the burglary is done by an "in-
ept burglar" or a "highly skilled burglar." Id.
73. The court used Keeton's definition of the reasonable expectation doctrine
word for word. Id. at 277. See supra note 5 for reference to Keeton's definition.
74. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (emphasisi added). The court's use of the words
"bend and stretch" are a particularly appropriate description of what courts do with
traditional insurance interpretive tools in order to achieve a fair result. Id. Cynics
may disparagingly refer to this process as "result-oriented." See John E. Simonett,
The Use of The Term "Result-Oriented" To Characterize Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 187 (1984). The reasonable expectations doctrine, however, frees the
court from going through hoops to get the result it wants.
75. This list by the court does not appear to be all-inclusive, as evidenced by the
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ensuing confusion, the court noted that an ambiguity is not a condi-
tion precedent to use the doctrine but merely a factor to be
considered.76
The holding of Atwater allowed the creamery to recover for the
burglary loss, giving the creamery the coverage it believed it had
when it purchased the insurance policy. While Atwater signaled the
beginning of Minnesota's use of the reasonable expectations doc-
trine, it failed to adequately formulate explicit standards for its appli-
cation. Since Atwater, the courts have struggled with application of
the reasonable expectations doctrine.77
B. Supreme Court Decisions Since Atwater
If the seeds of confusion were sown in Atwater, subsequent
supreme court decisions did nothing to stop the growth of that con-
fusion. Although the supreme court has discussed the reasonable
expectations doctrine several times since Atwater, it has not actually
used the doctrine exclusively either to provide or to limit coverage.
For example, the supreme court in Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard
Insurance Co. 78 used the reasonable expectations doctrine to justify
interpreting an ambiguity in favor of the policyholder. The court of
appeals limited coverage to an underinsured motorist by concluding
that the policy was not ambiguous and had only one reasonable in-
terpretation.79 The court of appeals did not discuss the reasonable
expectations doctrine or refer to Atwater. The holding was based
solely on the determination that the policy was not ambiguous. 80
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and granted the
policyholder more substantial coverage. 8' The court found the pol-
icy to be ambiguous, and thus it strictly construed the ambiguity
court's use of the language "such as." Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985).
76. See id. This analysis has led to many of the problems in later applications of
the doctrine.
77. A telling example is found in Merseth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 390
N.W.2d 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). After examining Atwater, the Merseth court stated,
"We are uncertain how the reasonable expectations doctrine applies in a case where
the provision at issue is clear and unambiguous .... In light of this uncertainty we
decline to apply the reasonable-expectations-regardless-of-ambiguity doctrine be-
yond the facts ofAtwater." Id. at 18.
78. 387 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1986).
79. Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 363 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
80. Id. at 497. In one part of the policy, the coverage was limited to $25,000 per
vehicle involved in an accident. The language in another part of the policy suggested
that the amounts of coverage for each insured vehicle could be stacked. Id. In light
of these different and contradictory clauses, the conclusion by the court that the pol-
icy was not ambiguous is questionable.
81. 387 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1986).
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against the insurer.82 The court then noted that construction of am-
biguities must not be beyond the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured. In support of this novel proposition, the court cited both
Atwater8 and Professor Keeton.8 4 Professor Keeton's quotation was
taken out of context by the Rusthoven court to be seemingly in sup-
port of their new proposition that ambiguities are limited by the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine.85
The Rusthoven court could have reached the same result by relying
solely on the doctrine of ambiguity. Instead the court expounded a
new proposition that the doctrine of reasonable expectations is a
limitation on the doctrine of ambiguity. The result has been even
more confusion about when and how to use the doctrine of reason-
able expectations.86
The dissent in Rusthoven objected to the majority's incorrect use of
the doctrine.87 The dissent pointed out that the rule adopted in
Atwater "does not provide a way to validate a decision already made
under the doctrine of ambiguity."88 The dissent then concluded that
despite the unartful assembly of the policy, the policyholder could
not have reasonably expected it was purchasing insurance based on
the number of vehicles the policyholder owned at any given time.8 9
The confusion generated by Rusthoven continued in the next
supreme court decision9O that discussed the doctrine of reasonable
82. Id. at 644-45.
83. Id. at 645.
84. The court quoted Professor Keeton;
It seems likely, however, that, even though not often expressed, there has
always been an implicit understanding that ambiguities, which in most cases
might be resolved in more than just one of the other of two ways, would be
resolved favorable to the insured's claim only if a reasonable person in his
position would have expected coverage.
Id. at 645 (quoting Keeton, supra note 1, at 969).
85. In the quoted material, Professor Keeton explained that ambiguities are not
necessary to invoke the doctrine of reasonable expectations because ambiguities do
not even exist unless there are two or more reasonable interpretations. See Keeton,
supra note 1, at 969-74. The doctrine of ambiguity simply provides the court a way to
choose between two or more reasonable interpretations. Thus, ambiguities are al-
ways resolved in favor of the non-drafting party. See supra notes 23-34 and accompa-
nying text.
86. See infra part III.C.
87. Rusthoven, 387 N.W.2d at 645-47.
88. Id. at 647. The dissent further stated "it seems to me that the majority has
abandoned a contract theory adopted only a year ago in Atwater. Id. at 646. To fur-
ther muddy the waters, the author of the dissent, Justice Coyne, put another twist on
the doctrine: "[I]nherent in the doctrine of reasonable expectations is the rejection
of the traditional rule that ambiguities are automatically construed most favorably to
the insured." Id. Apparently, justice Coyne sees the doctrine as a substitution for
traditional contract doctrines altogether. Id.
89. Id. at 647.
90. An intervening decision, American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 405
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expectations, Hubred v. Control Data Corp.9 1 The Hubreds had health
and accident insurance from Control Data through Mrs. Hubred's
employment at Control Data.9 2 Mr. Hubred was not employed by
Control Data. Injured at his job, Mr. Hubred filed a claim for cover-
age to his wife's Control Data insurance plan. Control Data denied
coverage, basing its denial on a clause in the contract which excluded
coverage for injuries sustained at work by non-Control Data employ-
ees. 93 The court found that the clause was not ambigious and clearly
excluded coverage for Mr. Hubred's injuries. The court discussed
but did not apply the reasonable expectations doctrine because the
Hubreds failed to prove any facts or circumstances that would justify
a reasonable expectation of coverage. 94
In dicta, the court revealed instances in which it believed the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations would apply. The court would con-
sider the following factors: 1) whether the policyholder is held to an
unreasonable level of understanding of the policy; 2) whether the
policy is ambiguous; 3) whether the policy contains language which
operates as a hidden exclusion; 4) whether oral communications
from the insurer explaining important but obscure conditions or ex-
clusions lead to an expectation of coverage; and 5) whether the gen-
eral public is aware that provisions in the policy provide coverage.95
The most recent supreme court decision discussing the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka.96
The central issue in Wicka was whether the intentional act exclusion
of the policy applied where the policyholder's act was the product of
N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1987), refers to the reasonable expectations doctrine but does
not analyze it. The court points out that its task is to interpret the contract language
at hand in light of the reasonable expectations of the insured. Id. at 422. In doing
so, the court concluded that a policyholder could not reasonably expect coverage for
an assault committed while the policyholder was voluntarily intoxicated. Id. Con-
ceivably, the court blurred its determination of the reasonable expectations of the
insured with its interpretation of the contract term, "bodily injury which is expected
or intended by an insured." See id. at 421.
91. 442 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1989).
92. Id. at 309.
93. Id. The policy excluded the following expenses from coverage: "Medical ex-
penses necessary because of an injury or disease incurred during employment for
wages or profit at or outside of Control Data, or covered by the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act or similar laws, statutes or decrees." Id. at 310.
94. Id. at 311.
95. For example, the common law, statutes and common usage define "bur-
glary" as entering into and stealing from a structure, even if entry was not forced. Id.
As the Hubreds were unable to show these factors the court did not apply the doc-
trine. The court also noted the fact that the Hubreds were not orally informed of the
exclusion did not, standing alone, free them from the responsibility of reading it. Id.
at 311.
96. 474 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1991).
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mental illness. 97 The reasonable expectations doctrine was not cen-
tral to this analysis, but the court did note its decision that the exclu-
sion did not apply was consistent with the reasonable expectations of
the policyholder. 98 The court saw no difference between injuries
caused by a mentally ill person who lacked the intent to injure and
other unintentional injuries that the policyholder would reasonably
expect to be covered.99
C. Court of Appeals Decisions Since Atwater
The court of appeals has discussed the reasonable expectations
doctrine in many cases since Atwater. First are those cases that limit
the doctrine to the facts of Atwater by requiring either an ambiguity
or a hidden exclusion.100 The first case in which a court of appeals
determined that the doctrine of reasonable expectations required
either an ambiguity or hidden exclusion was Merseth v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. 101 In Merseth, the policyholder crushed his son's leg
between his truck and a utility pole.102 The trial court found that the
homeowner's insurance policy excluded coverage for any injuries
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.' 0
3
On review, the court of appeals first found the exclusion was not
ambiguous and then analyzed whether the doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations applied.' 0 4 In finding that it did not, the court expressed
its frustration with the absence of guidelines for the using the doc-
trine.105 Pointing to Atwater, the court concluded that since the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine was applied to a hidden major
97. Id. at 325.
98. Id. at 331.
99. Id.
100. See Levin v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 465 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Zylberger, 422 N.W.2d 18, 23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988);
Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Sonneman
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 403 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
Gunderson v. Classified Ins. Corp., 397 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
Merseth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 390 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
See also National Indem. Co. v. Ness, 457 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). In Ness,
the court declined to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine beyond the facts of
Atwater. 457 N.W.2d at 758. The dissent in Ness pointed out that this case was clearly
a reasonable expectations case. "The doctrine of reasonable expectations should
have been applied and the finder of fact should now be required to decide whether
Ness' . . . expectations were reasonable." Id. at 760. The dissent noted that the
policyholder's reasonable expectations stemmed from inconsistency between the in-
surance application, the binder, the policy declaration, and the endorsements. Id.
101. 390 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
102. Id. at 17.
103. The exclusion provided that coverage did not apply to "bodily injury ...
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle." Id.
104. Id. at 17-18.
105. "[a]bsent more specific direction from the supreme court, we cannot extend
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exclusion, the doctrine should be limited to the facts of Atwater. 10 6
Subsequent court of appeals cases following Merseth have done just
that. By restricting the doctrine only to policies with ambiguities or
hidden major exclusions, the court slammed the door on cases where
policyholders had a reasonable expectation of coverage from some
other circumstances.107
Other court of appeals decisions have followed the Rusthoven
proposition.108 In Curtis v. Home Insurance Co. ,109 the policyholder's
employee was unable to obtain coverage for injuries received when
his car collided with another vehicle.110 The trial court determined
that the policy contained an ambiguous clause and found coverage
based on the sum of the underinsured motorist coverage on all the
vehicles covered by the policy. The court of appeals reversed, find-
ing that although the clause was ambiguous, the policyholder could
not have reasonably expected the liability limit to be the sum of all
the covered vehicles."'
The court relied on Rusthoven in its reasoning. 1 2 It distinguished
this case from Rusthoven because there were affidavits which showed
that the policyholder only intended the maximum amount of cover-
age to be based on one vehicle.113 Thus, even though the policy was
ambiguous and under the doctrine of ambiguity would have been
construed in favor of the policyholder, the court found the policy-
holder could not have reasonably expected coverage."14 The court
used the Rusthoven proposition to limit coverage that would have or-
dinarily existed under the traditional contract doctrine of ambiguity.
In some cases, the court of appeals has declined to find coverage
based on the reasonable expectations doctrine because the facts of
the case do not warrant it.115 Although this application of the doc-
the doctrine of reasonable expectations to find coverage under these circumstances."
Id.; see also supra note 75.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Levin v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 465 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (affirming trial court decision not to apply the doctrine without an ambiguity
or hidden major exclusion); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Zylberger, 422 N.W.2d 18 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (reading Atwater to require a finding of either an ambiguity or hidden
major exclusion prior to consideration of the doctrine).
108. See Bob Useldinger & Sons v. Hangsleben, 483 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); Morris v. Weiss, 414 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Curtis v. Home
Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
109. 392 N.W.2d 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
110. Id. at 45.
111. Id. at 46.
112. Id. at 45.
113. Id. at 46.
114. Id.
115. See Minnesota Mut. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Manderfeld, 482 N.W.2d 521,
525 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Sicoli v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 300,
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trine is seemingly correct, the court does not always find coverage
when in fact they should have. In Minnesota Mutual Fire & Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Manderfeld, 116 the court incorrectly found that the pol-
icyholder's expectations of coverage were not reasonable. Greg
Manderfeld was injured when his mother ran over his foot with a
lawnmower.117 The Manderfeld's insurance policy included an ex-
clusion providing that the policy did not provide coverage for bodily
injury caused to an insured by another insured under the policy.' 18
The Manderfelds argued that the exclusion violated their expecta-
tions of what the policy covered.'19
The court of appeals disagreed and found that there was no cover-
age for the injury because the exclusion was clear.120 The court er-
roneuosly based its holding on the fact that Michael Manderfeld was
a certified public accountant and should have understood the exclu-
sion without "painstaking study."1 2 1 The court recognized the
weakness of its holding when it stated,
Although we hold that the household exclusion was not shown to
violate the Manderfeld's reasonable expectations, we question
whether the general public contemplates such an exception when
purchasing homeowner's or renter's coverage. While we are aware
of no objective evidence that laypersons would not expect such ex-
clusions, as a practical matter this exclusion seems somewhat
counterintuitive. It seems difficult to argue that it is entirely unrea-
sonable to expect a homeowner's insurance policy to provide cov-
erage for family members injured by another family member's
negligence; they are after all those most likely to be found about
the home.'
2 2
Several decisions have properly applied the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine.12 In Wessman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. ,124 the
303 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Engel v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 455 N.W.2d 486,
488 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Marschall v. Reinsurance Ass'n of Minn., 447 N.W.2d
460, 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Empire State Bank of Cottonwood v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 441 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Farmers Union Oil Co. v.
Mutual Serv. Ins. Co., 422 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Seaway Port Auth. of
Duluth v. Midland Ins. Co., 430 N.W.2d 242, 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
116. 482 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
117. Id. at 523.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 525.
121. Id. The court did not explain why a certified public accountant should have
more knowledge about insurance policy exclusions.
122. Id.; see also Sicoli v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 300 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990). In Sicoli, the court declined to find coverage for a husband's loss of
consortium when definition of "bodily injury" could have given rise to a reasonable
expectation of coverage. Id. at 303.
123. Accordingly, there have been several decisons that have properly declined to
use the doctrine because other traditional contract doctrines apply. See Glarner v.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, applying Min-
nesota law, correctly found that the life insurance policy in question
provided coverage under the reasonable expectations doctrine.125
They determined that the ordinary reader of the policy would have
thought there was coverage. 126 In Grinnel Mutual Reinsurance Co. v.
Wasmuth,' 27 the court interpreted an exclusion in a liability policy to
determine if it excluded coverage for damages to a home and its oc-
cupants from formaldeyde.128 The court found coverage under the
reasonable expectations doctrine:
[T]his is the unusual case requiring application of Atwater. The or-
dinary reader of the exclusion would reasonably conclude that it
would not limit coverage for respondents' unexpected damage due
to installation of building materials in a home, but would exclude
pervasive environmental pollution problems such as hazardous
waste dumping.' 2 9
Another example of proper application of the doctrine can be
found in State Farm Insurance Cos. v. Seefeld. 130 In Seefeld, the court
found that the policyholder could not have had a reasonable expec-
tation of coverage because of an extraordinary fact situation cen-
tered around the use of a utility trailer and its negligent design.'Sl
Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing the doctrine be-
cause coverage was found based on unconscionability); Amatuzio v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (declining to apply the reason-
able expectations doctrine because coverage was found under the doctrine of ambi-
guity); Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thalman, 387 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(determining doctrine of reasonable expectations not applicable because coverage
existed under the doctrine of ambiguity).
124. 929 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1991).
125. Id. at 106.
126. Id.
127. 432 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
128. The policy exclusion stated,
This insurance does not apply . . .(f) to bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, contaminants or pollutants into
or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water.
Id. at 498. However there was an exception to this exclusion when the discharge or
release was sudden and accidental. Id.
129. Id. at 499.
130. 472 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
131. Id. at 174. The insured towed a utility trailer behind an all-terrain vehicle.
The trailor was attached to the all-terrain vehicle by a bolt through a make-shift hitch.
No cotter pin was used, and the bolt came loose during travel, causing injury to a
passenger in the trailer. Id. at 171.
Correct application of the doctrine can be found in other jurisdictions as well.
The Idaho Supreme Court properly applied the doctrine in Corgatelli v. Globe Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 737 (Idaho 1975). In Corgatelli, the list of risks covered
in a rodeo rider's insurance policy was so complete that failure to include acromi-
oclavicular separation would have escaped notice; therefore, the policyholder had a
reasonable expectation of coverage. Ironically, after applying the doctrine correctly,
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The inconsistency and vagueness of the reasoning behind these
decisions clearly indicates courts' confusion about the doctrine. Ad-
ditionally, it emphasizes the necessity of developing clear standards
of when and how to apply the doctrine.
IV. SUGGESTED STANDARDS FOR APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE
The doctrine of reasonable expectations serves an important pur-
pose in insurance policy interpretation. The doctrine protects poli-
cyholders from inequality in bargaining power. Proper use of the
doctrine promotes an informed choice by the policyholder and per-
mits the court to look beyond the contract and hold the insurer liable
for any expectation of coverage the contract may have created.1
3 2
Furthermore, the doctrine is a risk-distributing tool which spreads
the costs of otherwise uninsured loss.13
The reasonable expectations doctrine was developed in response
to situations in which judges wanted to protect policyholders from
inequality of bargaining power but the expected coverage was un-
available from other sources. The doctrine is one of last resort, to be
used only after equitable tools and doctrines of interpretation such
as the doctrine of ambiguity, estoppel and waiver, unconscionability,
and reformation are found not to apply. After the other tools have
been rejected, the court should address the reasonable expectations
of the policyholder, looking both to the policy itself and the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. The standard for determining
what expectations are reasonable should be an objective inquiry for
the fact finder.
A. When the Doctrine Applies
The first issue to be clarified is when the reasonable expectations
doctrine applies. The doctrine should be used when other rules of
interpretation and construction are exhausted.
Idaho has abandoned the doctrine altogether. See Casey v. Highland Ins. Co., 600
P.2d 1387 (Idaho 1979).
Iowa and Pennsylvania also apply the doctrine correctly. See C &J Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Iowa 1975) (holding that extrinsic
evidence of conversations with an agent prior to purchase of the policy formed a
basis for expectation even though the policy was ambigious in its exclusion of theft
with no visible signs of entry); Hionis v. Northern Mut. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 363, 366
(Pa. 1974) (holding that policyholders are not held to policy exclusions unless they
were given actual notice of the exclusion at the time of purchase).
132. Abraham, supra note 9, at 1169. The doctrine is concerned with accurate
information. The benefit of accurate information is that the policyholder can make a
better choice about which policy to choose. Id.
133. Id. Abraham includes an in-depth discussion of the risk distributing attrib-
utes of the reasonable expectations doctrine. Id. at 1185-89.
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One source of confusion is the way Atwater treated ambiguity.14
In Atwater, the court stated that ambiguity is not a condition prece-
dent to the reasonable expectations doctrine.'35 The court further
indicated that although ambiguity in the language of the contract is
not irrelevant, it is a factor in determining the reasonable expecta-
tions of the policyholder.136 However, ambiguity should be wholly
irrelevant to the doctrine of reasonable expectations because it is
neither necessary nor sufficient for application of the doctrine.
Moreover, since an ambiguity can be resolved by a traditional inter-
pretation of the policy under the doctrine of ambiguity, resort to the
reasonable expectations doctrine is not necessary. This issue may
have caused the confusion in later cases.
The reasonable expectations doctrine should be applied only
when other interpretive and constructive doctrines such as the doc-
trine of ambiguity do not apply and the facts indicate a need for con-
sumer protection. For example, a situation may arise where the
policy interpretation does not revolve around two different interpre-
tations of a provision or word but instead focuses on the way the
policy was marketed. If the court cannot use the doctrine of ambigu-
ity or any other traditional device, it must look to the reasonable ex-
pectations of the policyholder. 137
When the Atwater court stated that ambiguity in the policy was a
factor for determining whether the policyholder's expectations were
reasonable, it is logical that the court referred to ambiguities not in
the language that is at issue, but instead ambiguities in the policy or
arising from the marketing of the policy. For example, a policy may
contradict itself on a point not related to the coverage being liti-
gated. That type of ambiguity is then one more factor in determin-
ing the complicated nature of the policy and the policyholder's
inability to understand the coverage.
Another example of when an ambiguity should be considered is
when the policy is marketed in a manner that contrasts with its writ-
ten terms. That conflict creates an ambiguity which, when combined
with other factors, may have led the policyholder to reasonably ex-
pect coverage even if there was a clear exclusion in the policy itself.
That disparity is not strictly an "ambiguity" and should not be re-
ferred to in that way. In contrast, if the policy contains a term which
134. Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277
(Minn. 1985).
135. Id. at 277-78.
136. Id. at 278.
137. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284, 298 (Cal. 1962)
(holding that airline insurance policy created a reasonable expectation of coverage
because among other things it was purchased at a vending machine in an airport,
could not be read prior to purchase and a purchaser would be in a hurry and not have
time to peruse it for hidden exclusions).
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in itself is ambiguous or inconsistent with another term, then it
should be resolved according to the doctrine of ambiguity without
ever employing the reasonable expectations doctrine.
Similarly, the reasonable expectations doctrine should not be used
as a limitation on the ambiguity doctrine, as the court did in Rus-
thoven.138 The doctrine of ambiguity has an inherent limitation: it
considers only reasonable alternative interpretations of the suppos-
edly ambiguous provisions.' 3 9 The simpler approach is to ignore the
reasonable expectations doctrine if an ambiguity exists and to deter-
mine coverage based solely on the doctrine of ambiguity.
The reasonable expectations doctrine should be a substantive but
limited tool. It should be used to balance the inequality in bargain-
ing power in insurance contracts as well as to protect consumers who
cannot understand the difficult language in their policies. The doc-
trine of reasonable expectations should apply only in situations
where other rules of construction and interpretation do not suffice.
B. How the Doctrine Applies
Litigants and the lower courts need guidelines for proper applica-
tion of the reasonable expectations doctrine. Two recurring
problems must be resolved: whether the standard is objective or sub-
jective, and whether the question is one of fact or law.
In defining the reasonable expectations doctrine, Professor Kee-
ton said, "an idea of this principle incorporates the proposition that
policy language will be construed as laymen would understand it and
not according to the interpretation of sophisticated underwrit-
ers.' 140 Although Keeton took the view that the consumer's expec-
tations should be analyzed under an objective standard, courts have
used a subjective standard when determining whether the policy-
holder's interpretation was reasonable.t41
In Minnesota, the courts have used both an objective and a subjec-
tive standard to determine whether the policyholder's expectations
were reasonable.' 42 When the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
138. Minnesota has used the doctrine in this manner. See supra note 91. Keeton
points out there has always been an implicit understanding that ambiguities will be
resolved in the policyholder's favor only if a reasonable person would have expected
coverage. Keeton, supra note 1, at 969.
139. Implicitly, ambiguities are understood to be resolved in the policyholder's
favor only if a reasonable person in the same situation would expect coverage. Kee-
ton, supra note 1, at 969.
140. Keeton, supra note 1, at 967.
141. See, e.g., Stewart-Smith Haidinger Inc. v. AVI-Truck, Inc., 682 P.2d 1108,
1117-18 (Alaska 1984).
142. See, e.g., Wessman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 402, 406 (8th
Cir. 1991) (applying Minnesota law; objective standard); Atwater Creamery Co. v.
Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 276-77 (Minn. 1985) (objective stan-
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the reasonable expectations doctrine in Atwater, it clearly viewed the
reasonableness of the expectations as objective. The court stated,
"The insured may show what actual expectations he or she had, but
the fact finder should determine whether those expectations are rea-
sonable under the circumstances."143
To be fair to all policyholders, the reasonable expectations doc-
trine should be applied in an objective manner.144 An objective
standard eliminates some of the difficulty of factual issues and curbs
the potential for abuse. Furthermore, it promotes certainty and pre-
dictability.'45 In contrast, if a subjective standard is applied, policy-
holders have no idea whether their premium dollars are paying the
claims of others, claims which they reasonably believed were not cov-
ered under their own policy.t46 Under the subjective standard, it
dard); Schmidt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 376 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (subjective standard).
Some critics have advanced alternatives for determining expectations. For ex-
ample, reasonable expectations arguably could be determined by measuring the atti-
tude of the insured against the conduct of the insurer. Applying the standard this
way allows the insurance company more latitude in proving what it had intended to
cover in the policy. To date, this concept has not been accepted by any jurisdiction.
See Rahdert, supra note 3, at 387.
143. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 278; see also Wessman, 929 F.2d at 406 (applying
Atwater's application of reasonable expectation's doctrine); DeLand v. Old Republic
Life Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Alaska law; finding that
resolution of dispute as to surrounding circumstances is for the trier of fact).
Minnesota courts have demonstrated a willingness to use the objective standard
in other areas of law as well. For example, some Minnesota courts have recognized
that Rule 11 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure embodies an objective stan-
dard. Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 143 (Minn. 1990) (citing Brown v. Fed-
eration of State Medical Bds. of the U.S., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987), and
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985)). In
Uselman, the court's inquiry focused on the objective reasonableness of a prefiling
investigation by plaintiff's attorney. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 143. Negligence is an-
other area where reasonableness is a central issue. In negligence cases, the court has
held that the inquiry into the actor's reasonableness should always be objective. Fal-
lin v. Maplewood-North St. Paul Dist. No. 622, 362 N.W.2d 318, 321-22 (Minn.
1985) (holding school district to a duty of objective reasonable care when supervising
shop students). The inquiry made in reasonable expectations cases is essentially the
same-what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have expected the
coverage to be. Wessman, 929 F.2d at 406.
144. See the following works for discussion of the objective versus subjective stan-
dards: ROBERT BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERME-
NEUTICS AND PRAXIS 19 (1983); Dennis M. Patterson, Interpretation in Law-Toward a
Reconstruction of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1983) (arguing that the di-
chotomy between objective and subjective interpretations of legal texts is false); War-
ran F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence." Defining the Reasonable
Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO. L. J.
241 (1990) (demonstrating through use of an economic analysis that both the objec-
tive and subjective standards attempt to achieve the same results).
145. Keeton, supra note 1, at 969.
146. Id.
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would no longer be possible for an insurance company to know or
limit its risks because interpretation of the policy would be decided
on an individual basis. Such an approach is neither fair to the in-
surer nor to other policyholders. The policyholder is protected from
unfairness in his or her individual dealings by other equitable doc-
trines such as estoppel. 147
The objective standard, however, has created another area of con-
fusion in the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine:
whether the reasonableness of the policyholder's expectations is a
question of law or a question of fact.
When the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine in Atwater, 148 it stated that whether the expecta-
tions were reasonable was a question of fact.149 Despite Atwater,
many courts have subsequently applied the doctrine as a question of
law.'5 0 However, the Eighth Circuit has applied it as a question of
fact, pointing out that Atwater mandated such an application.t1l In
other jurisdictions, the treatment of this issue varies.1 52 For exam-
ple, the Iowa Supreme Court has determined that whether the doc-
trine should be applied is a question of law, but the extrinsic facts are
147. Rahdert, supra note 3, at 387.
148. 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985).
149. "The insured may show what actual expectations he or she had, but the fact
finder should determine whether those expectations were reasonable under the cir-
cumstances." Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d
271, 278 (Minn. 1985).
150. See, e.g., Grossman v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 461 N.W.2d 489, 493
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that interpretation of an insurance policy is a ques-
tion of law which the trial court may properly decide on a motion for summary judg-
ment, which is reviewed de novo on appeal); Schmidt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 376 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("Determination of reasonable ex-
pectation of coverage presents a question of law and thus we are not foreclosed from
considering this issue on appeal.").
Neither decision referred to Atwater when justifying its ruling. The Grossman
court based its ruling on a case decided before Atwater, Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v.
Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. 1978), and the Schmidt court based its decision
on a worker's compensation case, Rautio v. International Harvester Co., 180 Minn.
400, 404, 231 N.W. 214, 216 (1930).
151. See, e.g., Wessman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 402, 405 (8th
Cir. 1991) (applying Minnesota law; holding that under Minnesota law, whether in-
sured understood meanings of terms in life insurance form was question of fact for
the jury); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v.Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 1981) (apply-
ing Minnesota law; factual determination should be made by jury).
152. See, e.g., Hancock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1131, 1135 (11th Cir.
1990) (applying Alabama law; question of law); Norton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 902 F.2d 1355, 1357 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Arkansas law; question of law);
Granite State Ins. Co. v. Degerlia, 925 F.2d 189, 191 (7th Cir 1991) (applying Illinois
law; question of law). But see Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Ohio law; question of fact).
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questions for the jury. 153
If the reasonable expectations doctrine involves the determination
of what is reasonable under the circumstances, that determination
should be a question for the fact finder. This is basically the same
reasonableness standard used in negligence cases. Where reason-
able minds could differ as to whether the policyholder's expectations
were reasonable, the question is for the jury.154 The court should
first determine if the reasonable expectations doctrine is applica-
ble'55 and then instruct the jury on how to determine whether the
policyholder's expectations are reasonable.
The following proposed jury instruction reflects the reasonable
person standard applicable to other areas of the law:
In question - of the special verdict form, you must decide
whether had reasonable expectations of insurance
coverage for its claim. Reasonable expectations of
coverage are what the average policyholder would anticipate as the
scope of the coverage. The subjective expectations of the insured
are not determinative. However, actual expectations can be con-
sidered as evidence of what the average policyholder would antici-
pate. You must also consider other evidence in determining
whether 's expectation of coverage was reasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of reasonable expectations was adopted to protect
the policyholder from the greater expertise and bargaining power of
the insurer where traditional tools and doctrines of contract inter-
pretation could not be applied. In the permutations of the doctrine
addressed by Minnesota courts, this purpose is not being achieved.
Instead, Minnesota case law confuses the doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations with the traditional contract interpretation tools. Further,
courts apply the doctrine not as a last resort, but often as the first
doctrine considered. The reasonable expectations doctrine should
be applied only in the limited instances where other tools do not
fairly resolve the dispute over coverage. By saving the doctrine as a
153. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981).
154. Negligence cases in Minnesota have always embodied this distinction. See
Greenwald v. Northern State-s Power Co., 226 Minn. 216, 219, 32 N.W.2d 320, 323
(1948).
155. Mark Rahdert has formulated clear guidelines for the court in making this
determination. First, the court should consider the character of the insurance trans-
action. Second, the court should conduct an inquiry seeking information about the
typical insured. Third, the court should look at the policy structure and language.
Fourth, the court should consider the purposes of the insurance provision in relation
to the whole policy. Lastly, the court should consider the regulatory considerations.
Rahdert, supra note 3, at 389-91.
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last resort, the insurer is not subjected to case-by-case decisions of
all claims.
Clear guidelines must be established as to how the doctrine should
work. Allowing the factfinder to determine whether the expectations
were objectively reasonable will permit the most effective use of the
doctrine. Consistent application will protect the policyholder and in-
surer alike from unpredictable and uncertain results.
Laurie Kindel Fett
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